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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Many Americans see their country as a beacon to the world, a country where the
impoverished, oppressed or persecuted can come for a fresh start and a chance at selfimprovement. A parallel to the migration of people from around the world to the United
States is the migration of lawsuits regarding human rights violations from countries with
inefficient, corrupt or nonexistent judicial systems to U.S. courts. Since 1980, 1 a number
of foreign litigants with human rights claims have had success using the Alien Tort
Claims Act (“ATCA”), a once- forgotten provision within the Judiciary Act of 1789
allowing foreign nationals to sue U.S. citizens or other foreign nationals for violations of
the law of nations in U.S. courts. 2
In 1991, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) to codify a
cause of action for a subset of ATCA claims.3 Notably, while the rights of aliens to sue
under ATCA are expressly constrained only by the provision that they allege a violation
of the “law of nations,” plaintiffs pleading under TVPA (who can be either aliens or
citizens) are required to exhaust all local remedies before bringing suit in U.S. courts. 4
The doctrine of exhaustion is widely recognized around the world and has been widely
praised on the grounds that it supports efficiency, reduces costs to courts and litigants and
strengthens state sovereignty while providing exceptions for futility, unreasonable delay
or inadequate available local remedies. 5
The recent Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain has opened the
door to expanding TVPA’s exhaustion requirement to all ATCA suits. 6 The Ninth
*

JD, Northwestern University School of Law, expected May 2008.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3
Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, historical and statutory notes).
Congress passed TVPA in response to the ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See infra note 88.
4
Id.
5
See generally Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and Forum Non
Conveniens in International Litigation in U.S. Courts, 13 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 351, 358 (1980), Paula Rivka
Schocket, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. RE V. 223, 228 (1987) and CHITTHARANJAN FELIX
A MERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-83 (2d ed. 2004).
6
See 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (“[T]he European Commission argues as amicus curiae that bas ic
principles of international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must
have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other fora such as
international claims tribunals … We would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.”).
1
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Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided the first major judicial exegesis of the
arguments on both sides of the exhaustion debate in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC. The Ninth
Circuit held that exhaustion of local remedies is not required under ATCA, in part
because the exercise of judicial discretion in the field of international venue choice would
overstep judicial authority since Congress had not spoken on the issue. 7 That decision
was recently re-heard en banc by the Ninth Circuit.8
I argue in this casenote that the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding that no
independent exhaustion requirement exists as a requirement for ATCA under the statute’s
“law of nations” language, but that the doctrine of forum non coveniens (“FNC”) serves
all of the purposes and includes all of the elements of exhaustion. When the Ninth
Circuit considers Sarei en banc, it should recognize that the common law tests for FNC
dismissals contains an exhaustion requirement similar to the requirement codified in
TVPA and that FNC analyses of ATCA claims should be informed by the precedent of
TVPA exhaustion claims, since the underlying cause of action and the elements of the
discretionary analysis are so similar. In deciding against recognizing exhaustion as part
of an existing prudential doctrine, the court has split exhaustion from its proper place
within FNC. This could either cause future courts to ignore TVPA’s exhaustion precedent
or invite the imposition of a separate exhaustion requirement parallel to FNC, creating the
unduly onerous requirement for plaintiffs to respond to two affirmative defenses.
Part II of this case note discusses the Alien Tort Claims Act from its inception as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, through the emergence of its modern fo rm to the
questions raised by Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC. Part III discusses the Torture Victim
Protection Act as an instructive example of how an exhaustion requirement works in an
international context. Part IV analyzes the nature of exhaustion in international law, the
question of whether exhaustion should be read into ATCA, and how the possible methods
of doing so would impact litigants.
II. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. ATCA from 1798 to 2003

¶6

In §9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first Congress gave the federal courts
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”9 Although little legislative history
exists on this portion of the Judiciary Act, ATCA had its philosophical roots in Alexander
Hamilton’s Federalist 80, where he wrote, “as the denial or perversion of justice by the
sentences of the courts, as well as in any other manner, it is with reason classed among
the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of
all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”10 The Supreme Court
has determined that at its inception, the statute contained a jurisdictional grant over treaty

7

456 F.3d 1069, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006) withdrawn and superseded by Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193
(9th Cir. 2007). All references infra are to the 2007 opinion.
8
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (9th Cir. Aug 20, 2007) (NO. 02-56256, 02-56390).
9
Supra note 2.
10
THE FEDERALIST 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
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violations and three broad common law causes of action: piracy, violations against
ambassadors and violation of safe conduct. 11
In its early history, the ATCA was used sparingly. Before 1980 only two
successful cases were brought under the statute. In Bolchos v. Darrel, the District Court
of South Carolina granted restitution for three slaves seized from a Spanish ship as a
prize of war. 12 In Adra v. Clift, the District Court of Maryland adjudicated the wrongful
withholding of custody of a child between two aliens as a violation of the law of
nations. 13
The number of cases citing ATCA as a basis of jurisdiction remained extremely
sparse until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. 14 In Filartiga, a Paraguayan doctor living in New
York sued Americo Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay,
for the torture and death of his daughter, Joelito, in 1976, claiming the killing came as a
response to Filartiga’s opposition to the regime of President Alfredo Stroessner. 15 At the
commencement of the suit, Pena-Irala was detained in New York for immigration
violations; the U.S. government deported him while the lawsuit was pending. 16 PenaIrala’s Paraguayan counsel filed an affidavit stating that Paraguayan courts provided an
adequate remedy, but Filartiga claimed that such a suit wo uld be futile. 17
In holding that torture was a violation of the law of nations, the court expanded
jurisdiction under ATCA to some violations of international law beyond those envisioned
in the 1789 Judiciary Act. In determining the new limits of the statute, the court looked
to sources of international law. The Filartiga decision quoted the statement from The
Paquete Habana:
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 18

¶10

For additional support of a growing international common law, the court cited The
Statute of The International Court of Justice, which listed international conventions,
custom and judicial decisions of foreign nations as sources for international law, all
allowing torture prosecution. 19 Perhaps recognizing the import of its decision, the court
commented: “While the ultimate scope of those rights [to sue in U.S. courts for offenses
committed elsewhere] will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we
11

See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692 (2003).
3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
13
195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
14
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
15
Id. at 878.
16
Id. at 879.
17
Id. at 879-80.
18
175 U.S. 677 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
19
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881, n.8.
12
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hold that the right to be free from torture is now among them.”20 As a result of Filartiga,
litigants began to invoke ATCA as an all-purpose cause of action statute for an openended list of international law violations, both commercial and human rights-related,
testing the limits with varying success. 21
¶11
Although Filartiga remained the main standard in ATCA jurisprudence until Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain more than two decades later, the decision was not without
controversy and challenge. The most widely-recognized challenge to Filartiga came in
Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 22 In dismissing
claims against the Libyan government, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other
groups for injuries arising from a PLO attack on several civilian buses and private cars in
Israel, Bork held that ATCA is purely jurisdictional in nature and that the statute does not
create a cause of action for individual plaintiffs.23 The scope of possible claims under
ATCA also ran afoul of the separation of powers, Bork reasoned, because litigants would
test the limits of int ernational law norms, requiring courts to make decisions on issues
still controversial enough to be left to the political branches. 24 Practical concerns also
weighed against a private right of action, since a conflict of any size in which one or
more belligerents engaged in international law violations would result in an unwieldy
number of cases. 25 Although frequently cited, Bork’s analysis has not been widely
accepted. 26
B. Refining ATCA’s Jurisdiction: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
¶12

Filartiga opened the door to new claims under ATCA, but subsequent cases have
limited the list of possible claims available to individual litigants. 27 In 2004, the Supreme
Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which a Mexican national sued American
officials for illegal abduction and detention as part of a cross-border drug investigation. 28
The court held that a single illegal detention of less than one day did not violate a jus
cogens international norm required for ATCA jurisdiction. 29
¶13
The court found that the statute created no new causes of action other than the three
that were widely recognized in 1789 (piracy, crimes against diplomats and violations of
safe conduct) and violations of widely accepted international law “rest[ing] on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
20

Id. at 885.
See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1004 (1996) (holding
genocide, war crimes, summary execution and torture are actionable); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993
F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding war crimes are actionable); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707
(N.D.Cal. 1988) (holding that causing disappearances are actionable); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding environmental degradation and cultural genocide are not actionable);
and Amlon Metals, Ind. v. FMC Corp, 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding environmental torts are
not actionable).
22
726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 799.
25
Id. at 810.
26
See e.g. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D.Cal. 1987) (refusing to adopt Judge
Bork's reasoning).
27
Aside from the more general restrictions of Sosa, see generally supra note 21.
28
542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
29
Id. at 700.
21
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comparable to the features of the 18th -century paradigms” in place when the law was
passed. 30 Since Sosa’s brief illegal detention lacked the “definite content and acceptance”
of either the three Judiciary Act-era causes of action or the other causes of action
recognized in Filartiga and its progeny, the court said it fell outside the outer bound s of
possible suits under ATCA. 31
¶14
The defendants in Sosa did not claim non-exhaustion of local remedies or argue
that exhaustion should be a requirement of ATCA pleadings, but the court said in a
footnote that “we would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.”32
¶15
Though Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa contained only a footnote on the
exhaustion issue, the question of local remedies in Sosa’s case, in relation to ATCA
claims in general, was discussed thoroughly by the parties and in the numerous amicus
briefs filed prior to the case. The European Commission (“EC”) filed a brief on behalf of
neither party in which it claimed the exhaustion provision in the TVPA (discussed at
length infra) “endorsed the prevailing interpretation of [ATCA] as a protection against
other human rights abuses”33 in line with a rule of general international law developed to
give states the opportunity to remedy violations of international law before losing
jurisdiction to other states. 34 The EC urged the court to allow universal civil jurisdiction
of the type enabled by ATCA “only when the claimant would otherwise be subject to a
denial of justice.”35 In other words, jurisdiction should exist when local remedies are
non-existent or have been exhausted.
¶16
In a brief on behalf of international human rights and religious organizations in
support of Sosa’s claim, the University of Virginia International Human Rights Law
Clinic argued that U.S. courts use other doctrines to weed out cases that belong
elsewhere. For example, the forum non conveniens doctrine “requires dismissal of a
lawsuit if an adequate, alternative forum provides a more efficient venue – a standard that
inevitably leads to dismissal of claims that do not exhaust available domestic remedies.”36
C. Post-Sosa Discussion of Exhaustion in ATCA: Sarei v. Rio Tinto
¶17

The first extended discussion of the ramifications of the footnote in Sosa
suggesting that an exhaustion requirement may be implicit in ATCA came in Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC, a suit against a British mining company for human rights violations allegedly
committed by the government of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) following an uprising at
Rio Tinto’s Bougainville gold and copper mines. 37 The plaintiffs, PNG citizens, filed an
ATCA suit against Rio Tinto for its vicarious liability in atrocities allegedly committed
by the PNG military and government at the company’s behe st, including racial

30

Id. at 725.
Id. at 738.
32
Id. at 733, n.21.
33
Brief for the European Commission in Support as Amicus Curiae of Neither Party at 23, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, (2004) (No. 03-339).
34
Id. at 24.
35
Id. at 26.
36
Brief of International Human Rights Organizations and Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, (2004) (No. 03-339) 2004 WL 419422.
37
See Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198.
31
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discrimination, environmental devastation, war crimes and violations of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, among other charges. 38
The trial court granted Rio Tinto’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the suit for failure to
state a claim on justiciability grounds. 39 In doing so, the trial court did not accept the
defense’s argument that exhaustion was a requirement under ATCA, calling the statute “a
creature of domestic law” and stating that a plain reading of the statute contained no
reference to or inference of an exhaustion requirement. 40
The defendants also argued in the alternative that the case should be removed from
U.S. courts on forum non conveniens grounds, claiming PNG, Australia or Britain would
be adequate alternative forums. 41 The court denied the defense request to dismiss the suit
in favor of a PNG forum, citing the common law balancing of public and private factors
discussed infra. The private interest factors considered included the likely inability of the
plaintiffs to obtain a lawyer in PNG, the undue financial hardship associated with hiring
counsel and difficulties with the discovery process. 42 In considering the public interest
factors, the district court held that the defendants failed to show that PNG courts were
any less congested than U.S. courts and that requiring U.S. courts to interpret PNG law
would be more problematic than in other ATCA cases. 43 The court noted that denying
dismissal on FNC grounds was “particularly appropriate given that the case is brought
under the ATCA and alleges violations of international law.”44 The court also denied
dismissal in favor of a suit in Australia, since the plaintiffs’ claims were not cognizable
under Australian law. 45 The district court decision does not discuss the possibility of
dismissing the case in favor of a British forum.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Between the trial
court’s ruling and the circuit court’s review of the case, the Supreme Court published
Sosa, forcing a re-evaluation of the possibility that non-exhaustion is a valid affirmative
defense. 46
The Ninth Circuit looked to ATCA’s legislative history to determine whether the
drafters of the Judiciary Act assumed an exhaustion requirement. Majority opinion
author Judge Fisher cited the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, noting that it was passed
shortly after the Judiciary Act and contained an exhaustion requirement, the implication
being that had ATCA assumed exhaustion, including a similar requirement in the Jay
Treaty would be redundant. 47 Fisher then discussed the differences between ATCA and
TVPA, passed as an amendment to the statute containing ATCA. The TVPA contained
an exhaustion requirement that applied only to claims of torture and extrajudicial killing,
not to any other provisions of the statute. 48 When Congress amended ATCA to add
TVPA, it did not add an exhaustion requirement to ATCA lawsuits that were beyond the
38

Id. at 1197.
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
40
Id. at 1139.
41
Id. at 1164.
42
Id. at 1174.
43
Id. at 1175.
44
Id. at 1175.
45
Id. at 1177-1178.
46
See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
47
Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215.
48
Id. at 1215-1216.
39
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new statute. 49 As to whether exhaustion should be a matter of judicial discretion, the
court said that courts lacked the discretion to add an exhaustion requirement because to
recognize any judicial discretion for ATCA claims in manners related to jurisdiction
would overrule Congress’ inaction on the issue by the issuance of a judicial fiat. 50
¶22
On the issue of whether exhaustion is an element of widely recognized
international law, the court’s majority opinion differentiates the ubiquity of exhaustion
requirements in international treaties and court opinions from ATCA’s grounding in
international law by noting that the issues of sovereignty at stake when an international
body adjudicates a dispute between two signatory nations are not implicated by ATCA
litigation brought by a foreign national against another in a U.S. court. 51
¶23
The court also reasoned that exhaustion rules, as they exist in international
tribunals, are strictly procedural. The majority opinion in Sarei rejects the notion of
denial of justice as a necessary part of an international claim as advanced in
Interhandel, 52 citing the International Court of Justice case Phosphates in Morocco,
which held that the responsibility for a substantive harm arose when the harm took place,
not when local remedies were exhausted. 53 The dissent essentially passes on the issue,
citing international law and secondary sources that fall on both sides of the issue of
whether exhaustion is substantive or procedural, 54 but concluding that “Sosa’s rule would
incorporate even procedural exhaustion, because the international community does not
recognize virtually any ‘violation of the law of nations’ without it.”55 Essentially, the
dissent concludes that it does not matter whether the doctrine is substantive or procedural
because, even if it could be deemed “procedural,” it falls into a newly- invented category
of “super-procedural” doctrine that requires it to be considered a widely accepted norm of
international law as per Sosa.
¶24
Issues of international law aside, the majority and dissenting opinions in Sarei also
differed on whether exhaustion could be used by judges as a prudential doctrine. In his
dissent in Sarei, Judge Bybee wrote that exhaustion of local and administrative remedies
has long been a part of American jurisprudence, but has served as “one among related
doctrines - including abstention, finality, and ripeness – that govern the timing of federal
court decisionmaking.”56 Just as the international law doctrine of exhaustion exists partly
to respect the sovereignty of independent states, domestic exhaustion considerations often
arise out of a deference to the separation of powers and a concern that adjudicating a
49

Id. at 1222. For additional discussion on the differences between ATCA and TVPA, see generally infra
notes 84-88.
50
Id. at 1223.
51
Id. at 1220 (“[T]he exhaustion limitation imposed on and accepted by international tribunals as a
requirement of international law is not dispositive as to a United States court’s discretion to impose
exhaustion as part of the ATCA.”).
52
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
53
Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1221, citing Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.)1938 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B) No. 74, at 28
(June 14). The court also cites A MERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 416 (“Judges
or states may have made statements supporting the view that the [exhaustion] rule is substantive, but the
practice of [international] judicial bodies relating to the rule leads overwhelmingly to the conclusion that
the rule has not been treated as substantive or as both substantive or procedural, but as solely procedural in
character.”).
54
See generally Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1234-1235.
55
Id. at 1236, note 11.
56
Id. at 1225, (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded on other grounds by
statute as recognized in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)).
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matter that has not been fully exhausted in other appropriate channels usurps discretion
and power from its rightful holders. 57 The majority opinion in Sarei dismissed the
comparisons between domestic and international exhaustion, stating, “We should not be
lulled into a false sense of familiarity with the term ‘exhaustion’ just because it is the
same term that we use to describe an analogous doctrine in our domestic law.”58
¶25
The ruling in Sarei is an important milestone in ATCA jurisprudence since it
addresses the post-Sosa exhaustion question on three grounds: exhaustion as widely
accepted international law, exhaustion as a substantive or procedural rule and exhaustion
as a matter of judicial discretion. When the Ninth Circuit reconsiders Sarei en banc, it
will reconsider a decision that discusses these major elements in detail. But, as discussed
below, the court’s exhaustion analysis misses one important factor: whether exhaustion
requirement is already incorporated into an analysis of an existing rule, namely forum
non conveniens.
D. Forum Non Conveniens in ATCA Cases
¶26

Pleadings under ATCA are similar to pleadings under most other statutes with
regards to venue choice, including the requirement that the court establish personal
jurisdiction and the doctrine of forum non conveniens (FNC). 59
¶27
FNC is a doctrine that states that a court can “decline to exercise its jurisdiction,
even though the court has venue, where it appears that for the convenience of the parties
and the court, and in the interests of justice, the action should be tried in another
forum.”60 The common law doctrine of FNC is similar to exhaustion as envisioned in the
TVPA and under international treaties because, like exhaustion, it allows the defense to
request a case to be dismissed from one court because it belongs in another. 61 The power
to dismiss under FNC “finds its roots in the inherent power of the courts ‘to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’”62
¶28
The defendant in Filartiga argued for FNC, arguing that Filartiga’s claim should
have been brought in a Paraguayan court, to which the plaintiff claimed futility. 63 The
district court did not address the issue because it dismissed Filartiga’s claims on other
grounds and as a result, the Second Circuit did not address the issue. 64 If it had, it would
have likely come to the same conclusion as it did without the decision: that Filartiga
could pursue his claims in U.S. federal court. This is because FNC is so similar to
exhaustion in form and function.
57

Id. at 1226, (citing Pavano v. Shalala, 95 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1984)) (“Parties are generally required to
exhaust their administrative remedies, in part because of concerns for separation of powers.”).
58
Id. at 1220, n.31.
59
See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992).
60
Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1306-7 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d
1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985)).
61
Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1237, n.12, (c iting Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 311 F.2d
429, 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding Cuban courts are a more suitable forum for a claim brought by political
refugees)), vacated on other grounds, 376 U.S. 779, 84 S. Ct. 1130, 12 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1964).
62
Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftgaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 497 (2d Cir. 2002)
quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
63
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 I.L.M 585, reprinted in 12 HASTINGS
INT ’L & COMP . L. RE V 34 (1988) (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
64
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 879.
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Adjudicating FNC motions is a two-part test in which the defendant has the burden
of proving that the factors weigh in their favor. 65 The first part of the test is to determine
whether there is an “alternative forum” available to the parties. FNC “presupposes at least
two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process,”66 so a court that dismisses a
lawsuit on FNC grounds must first ascertain that an alternative forum exists. 67 Even if
such a forum exists, it will be considered inadequate “where the plaintiff demonstrates
that he would encounter exceptional legal, political or practical barriers in litigating in the
other forum, such as the prospect of execution or a justice system clo sed to him as a
member of an outcast class.”68 An inadequate forum is “characterized by a complete
absence of due process or an inability of the forum to provide substantial justice to the
parties.”69 This language is extremely similar to language used by courts evaluating
whether suits brought pursuant to the TVPA should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
local remedies. 70
¶30
The second part of the test involves a weighing of public and private interest
factors. As listed in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, relevant "private interests" include: (1) the
private interest of the litigant; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the
cost and availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (4) the
possibility of view of premises where the actions in question took place; (6) “all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive;” and (7)
the enforceability of a judgment. Public interest factors include the congestion of courts
and the difficulty of a court interpreting the law of another jurisdiction. 71 Later cases
have also included within the scope of FNC inquiry which venue “will serve the ends of
justice” and whether “litigation may be conducted elsewhere against all defendants” in
the proposed alternate venue. 72 These factors are almost identical to those that inform the
doctrine of exhaustion. 73 In the realm of human rights cases pursued under the TVPA
discussed infra, exhaustion defenses have not to date hinged on unsatisfactory results in a
foreign court, but the inability of a plaintiff to sue in a foreign court due to intimidation,
excessive delay, statutory immunity or lack of due process.

65

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-7, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), superseded by
statute on other grounds as recognized in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F. Supp.
317 (S.D.Miss. 1989).
67
Murray v. BBC, 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1996).
68
Turedi v. Coca Cola Co., 2006 WL 3187156 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F.
Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985)).
69
Monegasque, 3111 F.3d at 499. See also Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
1143 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding “[a]n alternative forum is inadequate if the claimants cannot pursue their
case without fearing retaliation”) citing Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, et al. No. 01-3399, slip op. at
4 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 5, 2003) (finding that a “credible threat of retaliatory violence against Plaintiffs” renders
the alternative forum in Guatemala insufficient) and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the alternative forum of Sudan inadequate partly
because the plaintiffs “would be endangered by merely returning”).
70
Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
71
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. For purposes of ATCA, the choice of law factors are irrelevant under the Sosa
construction of ATCA, since the law being applied is international law, recognized by all civilized nations.
72
PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998).
73
See e.g. Schocket A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture
Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. RE V. at 227 (1987) (“[exhaustion] assumes local
adjudication is speedier, less expensive, and more effective.”).
66
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¶31

The seven “private interests” Gilbert factors tend to argue in favor of pushing
ATCA cases out of American courts and into the judicial systems of countries where the
actions on which ATCA claims are based took place. However, courts are amenable to
hearing human rights cases under ATCA despite the presence of another forum because
the Gilbert “public interest” factors should also include a consideration of policy interest
in providing a forum for such cases. In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court dismissal on FNC grounds partially
because Congressional action in passing the TVPA shows a policy preference for hearing
claims of violations of international law in the United States. 74
¶32
As is the case with other causes of action, FNC is an obstacle to ATCA plaintiffs.
An illustrative example is Abdullahi v. Pfizer, in which a group of Nigerian citizens
received an experimental antibiotic without their knowledge during an epidemic. 75 The
district court dismissed on FNC grounds since the plaintiffs were pursuing a parallel suit
in Nigerian courts, which provided a more appropriate forum. The defendant, Pfizer,
Inc., claimed that Nigeria’s Kano Federal High Court was a more appropriate forum. The
plaintiffs responded that the Nigerian court lacked a “modicum of independence and
impartiality necessary to ensure that the remedy available in the alternative forum [is not]
so inadequate to amount to no recovery at all.”76
¶33
Citing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,77 the court said the traditional preference for a
forum closer to where the acts in question allegedly took place could be defeated under
“rare circumstances” when “the remedy offered is clearly unsatisfactory,” and “if the
plaintiff shows that conditions in the foreign forum plainly demonstrate that ‘plaintiffs
are highly unlikely to obtain basic justice therein.’”78 The district court found the
Nigerian court the preferable venue. 79 In doing so, the court found that the plaintiffs’
conclusory statements about the independence of the Nigerian judiciary were insufficient
to defeat the defendant’s FNC motion. 80
¶34
However, plaintiffs have successfully used arguments such as those made by the
plaintiffs in Abdullahi to defeat FNC motions. In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
plaintiffs defeated an FNC motion by citing documents including a State Department
Human Rights Report for Colombia, the proposed alternate venue, that listed intimidation
of judges, prosecutors and witnesses as a major problem for that country’s judicial
system. 81 The defense argued that the documents were inadmissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, but the court held that it had the discretion to review the documents in
considering a motion to dismiss for FNC.82 Similar tactics have been used to defeat
exhaustion claims under TVPA. 83

74

226 F.3d 88, 108. It should be noted that the plaintiff in this case alleged torture, which would have been
actionable under TVPA had the defendant been an individual, but since the defendants are corporations,
ATCA provided the cause of action.
75
2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), upheld in part, vacated in part, 77 Fed.Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003).
76
Id. at *6 (citing Plaintiff’s Mem. in Opp. at 29.).
77
454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
78
Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956 at *8.
79
Id. at *10.
80
Id. at *9.
81
Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
82
Id. at n.4.
83
See infra note 91.
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III. THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991
A. TVPA Generally

¶35

¶36

¶37

¶38

¶39

In 1991, Congress passed the TVPA, which created a specific cause of action for
victims of torture or extrajudicial killing in foreign countries and for the first time gave
U.S. citizens a cause of action for international law violations outside the country. 84 In
doing so, it carved out a piece of ATCA’s jurisdictional and cause of action grants and
subjected plaintiffs pleading under the act to an exhaustion requirement that is not clearly
under ATCA. The exhaustion provision states, “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim
under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in
the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”85
The Senate report accompanying TVPA acknowledges that torture and extrajudicial
killing violate the law of nations and are actionable under ATCA, citing Filartiga. 86 In
noting that the statute gives jurisdiction and a cause of action to federal courts for a class
of actions over which they already have both, the report claims a statute providing a
specific grant is needed (1) because Judge Bork’s concurrence in Tel-Oren threatened the
private right of action under ATCA; and (2) to be in clear compliance with the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (the Torture Convention). 87
Under TVPA, filing a claim in a U.S. court is “virtually prima facie” evidence of
exhaustion of local remedies, but non-exhaustion can be used as an affirmative defense.
If non-exhaustion is claimed, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to show that remedies
were “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”88
The Senate report said the provision “can be expected to encourage the development of
meaningful remedies in other countries.”89
The TVPA did not repeal ATCA, but courts have interpreted it to supersede ACTA
in cases of torture or extrajudicial killing involving both citizen and alien plaintiffs. In
Enaharo v. Abubakar, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that TVPA “hold[s] the
field” due to the presence of an additional requirement for the cause of action, namely
exhaustion. 90 If plaintiffs could choose whether to file a claim under TVPA or ATCA,
the court reasoned, the lower requirements of ATCA would make TVPA redundant.
However, the court left the door open for TVPA’s redundancy (and for the inclusion of
an exhaustion requirement in ATCA) by noting “it may be that a requirement for
exhaustion is itself a basic principle of international law.”91
Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Enaharo provides an alternate view of the TVPA’s
relationship to ATCA. Citing the canon of construction positing that repeals by
84

See Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
Id. at note 2a.
86
S.Rep. 102-249 at 2 (1991).
87
Id. at 5; see also Torture Convention, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
88
Id. at 10.
89
Id. at 5.
90
408 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2005), cert denied 546 U.S. 1175 (Feb 21, 2006) (NO. 05-788).
91
Id. at 886. This raises the question of whether the discovery of an exhaustion requirement in ATCA,
through international law or FNC, would render TVPA redundant in form and function for all cases not
involving American citizens.
85

165

NORTHWEST E R N J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L H U M A N R I G H T S

[2007

implication are disfavored, Judge Cudahy interpreted the TVPA as creating a new cause
of action for litigants who have been torture victims in other countries. 92
B. Exhaustion under TVPA
¶40

The operation of the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement may be a good indicator of
how exhaustion would operate under ATCA should such a requirement be read into the
statute. TVPA case law shows the difficulties of requiring U.S. courts to sit in judgment
of foreign legal systems and the relative ease with which most plaintiffs can defeat the
non-exhaustion defense. Compared with the difficulty many plaintiffs face defeating
FNC motions, the exhaustion defense, as it operates under TVPA, is often a mere
formality. This leads to the conclusion that if the factors considered in an exhaustion
analysis were added to the balancing of factors implicit in the FNC test, a greater number
of ATCA plaintiffs would survive FNC motions.
¶41
In Abiola v. Abubakar, the difficulties inherent in evaluating a foreign judicial
system were mitigated by the fact that the alternate forum in question, Nigeria, publishes
laws in English and has a familiar common law system. 93 Despite these advantages, the
court’s determination that the plaintiffs were excused from exhausting local remedies
exposes some common issues encountered in the process of adjudicating an exhaustion
defense.
¶42
The plaintiffs in Abiola were all Nigerian citizens who claimed that either they or
their parents were tortured by the military junta that ruled their country between 1993 and
1999 for their pro-democracy views or activism. 94 The defendant, General Abdulsalami
Abubakar, was a member of the regime and its leader for the last year of its reign before
the restoration of civilian authority and stood accused of ordering their torture. Among
other defenses brought by Abubakar, he claimed that local remedies available in Nigeria
had not been exhausted by the plaintiffs. To adjudicate these claims, the court held an
evidentiary hearing at which both sides called witnesses who professed expertise with
Nigerian law to help the court decide on Abubakar’s exhaustion defense. 95
¶43
Abubakar called Nigerian commercial lawyer Adebayo Adaralegbe, who testified
that Nigeria’s 1999 constitution is retroactively effective and allows plaintiffs to sue
under its human rights provisions for violations that occurred during the military junta’s
reign. 96 Specifically, the cons titution states that “any person who alleges that any of the
provisions of [the chapter of the constitution dealing with fundamental rights] has been, is
being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High
Court in that state for redress.”97 Adaralegbe also testified that while the military junta
abrogated provisions of a previous constitution protecting fundamental human rights, the
regime’s assent to the African Charter created an avenue for suit, as does the Nigerian
common law of torts, which has a six- year statute of limitations in Lagos state. 98

92

Id. at 887.
435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill 2006) (Abiola II), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1175 (2006).
94
Id. at 832.
95
Id. at 833.
96
Id.
97
Const. of Nigeria, §46, Ch. IV (1999).
98
Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
93
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The plaintiffs called Nigerian human rights lawyer Femi Lalana, who agreed with
Adaralegbe about his interpretation of the African Charter and the common law, but
claimed that another Nigerian statute, the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA),
imposed a statute of limitations of three months and that the 1999 constitution is not
retroactive for human rights violations committed by the military junta. 99
In finding that local remedies in Nigeria were futile, the court agreed that the
POPA’s short statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff’s case and that Nigeria’s
common law of torts was a futile avenue for relief because the country’s judicial system
was largely corrupt, intimidated and ignored, even after the transition to democracy.
Citing the U.S. Department of State country reports for Nigeria between 2000 and 2005,
the court said, “during the time of the regime, military decrees barred Nigerian courts
from calling into question the regime’s actions, and that ‘even if a courageous judge
might have proceeded despite the military decrees … the military routinely ignored any
occasional judgments that may have been issued against the government.’”100
Abiola objected to the over-reliance on the State Department’s country reports,
noting that the reports’ language changed little from year to year and were subject to
political judgment. The Seventh Circuit expressed similar concern on over-reliance on
country reports in several cases. 101 Despite the objection, the court held that the plaintiffs
had met their burden in responding to the defendant’s affirmative defense of nonexhaustion. 102
The use of evidentiary hearings to evaluate foreign judicial systems as seen in
Abiola is not standard practice in TVPA cases. In Xuncax v. Gramajo, seven Guatemalan
expatriates and one U.S. citizen sued Guatemala’s former Minister of Defense for
atrocities committed under his watch against that country’s Kanjobal Indians. 103 The
Guatemalans sued under ATCA and did not plead exhaustion. The U.S. citizen, Dianna
Ortiz, sued under TVPA since ATCA does not provide a cause of action for U.S. citizens.
In finding Gramajo liable and awarding $3 million in compensatory damages, the
court addressed the issue of exhaustion, finding that Ortiz lacked sufficient remedies in
Guatemalan courts. However, unlike Enaharo and Abiola, the court did not cite any
Guatemalan statute or constitutional provision blocking a cause of action. To the
contrary, Ortiz traveled to Guatemala in 1992 to testify in a criminal case against
Gramajo that had languished without progress for several years. Since Guatemalan
courts do not allow civil actions until final judgment in the criminal action has been
reached, the court found that delays in the criminal case were sufficient to prove
exhaustion of local remedies. 104
Even the existence of a judgment against a TVPA defendant in the country where
the actions at issue occurred does not necessarily serve as a bar against suit in a U.S.
court. In Jean v. Dorelein, the plaintiffs won a legally binding judgment in a Haitian
court in 2000, in which the defendant, a Colonel in the Haitian Armed Forces and Chief

99

Id. at 834.
Id. at 837.
101
See generally Zheng v. Gonzalez, 409 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2005), Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 754
(7th Cir. 2004) (on whether State Department reports should be trusted in relation to other evidence).
102
Abiola, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
103
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass 1995).
104
Id. at 178.
100
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of Personnel, was found liable for an attack on civilians in Raboteau, Haiti, in 1994. 105 In
reversing the district court’s dismissal on non-exhaustion and other grounds, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that since the 2000 ruling, Dorelien was freed from prison
during an uprising and the judge who prosecuted the case had been attacked by a violent
mob. Citing the Senate report’s statement on the burden of proof for the non-exhaustion
defense, the court found that the defendant had not met his burden that the plaintiff could
presently file a successful case in Haiti. 106
In cases where the defendants have not made a claim of non-exhaustion of local
remedies, the Senate report’s statement that the filing of a suit under TVPA is virtual
prima facie evidence of exhaustion has been followed by federal courts. 107
Even when courts have found that some local remedies do exist and are functional,
they do not automatically serve as proof of non-exhaustion. Defendants in a suit for
human rights violations related to an oil project in Nigeria cited the existence of the
Oputa Commission108 as an “alternative remedy” for plaintiffs denied justice by a corrupt
judiciary. However, since the Commission’s main purpose “is not to remedy [human
rights] violations, but to promote reconciliation,” the defendant’s burden of proof had not
been met. 109
While most defendants either fail to claim non-exhaustion or fail to meet the
burden of proof, there are examples where courts have found in the defendant’s favor. In
Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the mother of a peace activist killed by an Israeli bulldozer
while standing in front of it to block the demolition of Palestinian homes in the Occupied
Territories sued the bulldozer’s manufacturer on the grounds that it knew of and helped
the Israeli military commit extrajudicial killings using their products. 110
In claiming non-exhaustion, the defense reply in support of the motion to dismiss
noted that the TVPA exhaustion requirement is not met simply by arguing that the
foreign court is not amenable to claims under international law, but that a “similar” claim
must be available in the proposed alternative forum. 111 Additionally, the brief cites the
fact that 700 suits by Palestinians regarding the Israeli government’s activities in the
Occupied Territories were pending in Israeli courts at the time and that Corrie had a suit
pending in Israeli court. 112 The district court accepted the defense’s non-exhaustion
argument (among others), adding that Israeli courts “are generally considered to provide
an adequate alternative forum for civil matters.”113
105

Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 783.
107
See generally Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (Suit not
dismissible for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on non-exhaustion grounds because defendant failed to
claim non-exhaustion. However, the suit was dismissed on other subject matter grounds).
108
A government commission on human rights violations occurring during the period of military rule.
109
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 319887 at *18 (S.D.N.Y.).
110
403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005) affirmed by Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2007 WL 2694701 (9th
Cir. 2007). The 9th Circuit decision upheld the district court’s dismissal of the suit on political question
doctrine grounds and thus did not address the issue of exhaustion.
111
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Caterpillar Inc. pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for Failure to State A Claim and Pursuant to the Political Question and Act of State Doctrines, 22,
2005 WL 2889368 (Sept. 22, 2005) (citing Xuncax, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1267). See also Reyno, 454 U.S. at
254 n.22 (1981) (on the adequacy of foreign remedies that are not exactly analogous to the domestic
equivalent).
112
Id.
113
Corrie, 403 F. Supp.2d at 1026 (citing Diatronics Inc. v. Elbit Computers, 649 F. Supp. 122, 127-9
106
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In the fifteen year history of the TVPA, exhaustion has never been a particularly
effective affirmative defense. Suits under the Act are far more often defeated on the
grounds that the alleged torture was not committed “under color of law,”114 or that TVPA
applies specifically to “individuals” and not corporations or government agencies. 115 On
its own, the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust local remedies has not been particularly
difficult to defeat by plaintiffs due to the placement of the burden of raising the issue on
the defe ndant and the significant nexus between countries where torture and extrajudicial
killing take place and countries with non- functioning, poorly- functioning or corrupt
judicial systems. It can be argued that the rate of success among TVPA plaintiffs in
defeating non-exhaustion defenses is a result of venue selection that takes exhaustion into
account, but such a claim would be problematic to evaluate objectively.
C. Forum Non Conveniens under TVPA

¶55

As discussed supra, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is often a major obstacle
for litigants pleading under ATCA. However, due to a more detailed legislative history
favoring the adjudication of specific causes of action in U.S. courts, plaintiffs pleading
under TVPA are less likely to have their cases dismissed on FNC grounds.
¶56
For example, the trial court in Abiola refuted an argument made by the defendant in
favor of FNC by citing the House of Representatives report for TVPA, which states in
part, “A state that practices torture and summary execution is not one that adheres to the
rule of law. The general collapse of democratic institutions characteristic of countries
scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights rarely leaves the judiciary
intact.”116
¶57
In Wiwa, the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that U.S. courts are an
inappropriate venue for a suit between Nigerians residing in the U.S. and a corporation
based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands over actions occurring in Nigeria. 117 In
overturning the lower court’s decision, the Second Circuit noted the reports
accompanying TVPA articulate a policy preference favoring litigation of torture and
extrajudicial killing cases in U.S. courts, writing, “[i]f in cases of torture in violation of
international law our courts exercise their jurisdiction conferred by the 1789 [Judiciary]
Act only for as long as it takes to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens, we will
have done little to enforce the standards of the law of nations.”118

(S.D.N.Y. 1986)), Postol v. El-Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 690 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
114
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 393 F. Supp. 2d
20 (D.D.C. 2005).
115
Unlike the TVPA, ATCA does allow suits against corporations. See NCGUB v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329
(C.D. Cal. 1997). For dismissals of cases alleging non-individual liability under TVPA, see Collett v.
Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2005) (TVPA does not apply to
government agencies as defendants); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382
(E.D.La.1997) (hold ing TVPA does not apply to corporations as plaintiffs).
116
Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F. Supp. 2d 907, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, pt.1, at 3
(1991)).
117
Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99.
118
Id. at 106.
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IV. ANALYSIS : DOES SAREI GET IT RIGHT?
A. Exhaustion as Widely Recognized International Law
¶58

The dissent in Sarei argued that since the causes of action available under ATCA
derive from widely recognized international law, and since exhaustion requirements exist
throughout international law, exhaustion should be required under ATCA. 119 There is a
large volume of material that speaks to the notion that the doctrine of exhaustion is a
well-developed standard in international law.
¶59
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms has an admissibility requirement that includes exhaustion: “The Court may
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to
the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a period of six months
from the date on which the final decision was taken.”120 Under the Convention, an
individual must pursue both administrative and judicial remedies; these are considered
exhausted when: (1) the highest competent domestic court grants a final and unappealable
decision; or (2) when an individual applicant can prove available remedies are inadequate
or ineffectual; or (3) when an applicant claiming human rights violations can prove the
probability of failure. 121 The Convention has a stricter exhaustion requirement than the
TVPA, since the respondents’ failure to raise a non-exhaustion defense does not waive
the right to do so at a later time, and the trying body has an ex officio duty to determine
whether local remedies have been exhausted, a duty not required of U.S. courts
adjudicating TVPA claims. 122
¶60
Several other treaties specifically require exhaustion before international human
rights bodies may hear a case. For example, the United Nations Convention on
Elimination of Racial Discrimination provides:
The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available
domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law.
This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged. 123
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture states:
After all the domestic legal procedures of the respective State and the
corresponding appeals have been exhausted, the case may be submitted to

119

Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1231.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Art. 35, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
121
Paula Rivka Schochet, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Remedies and Expanding Human Rights
Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. at 248 (1987).
122
Id. at 249.
123
U.N. Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Art. 11, Para. 3, 5 I.L.M. 350 (1966).
120
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the international body whose competence has been recognized by that
State. 124
And the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies that:
[T]he Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has
ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized
principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the
application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. 125
¶61

The language of these exhaustion clauses is important to note because of the
common allusions to “generally recognized principles of international law.” These
references weaken the claim that the codification of exhaustion requirements in treaties
speaks to the requirement being non-standard.
¶62
However, there are several differences between ATCA and the above-referenced
treaties that make their statutory language less than fully applicable to the question of
whether ATCA should recognize exhaustion as a substantive element of international
law. First and foremost, in all cases that come before the human rights bodies in the
treaty language cited above, the defendants are states, not individuals. ATCA, however,
does not allow for litigation against states. Additionally, the treaties apply to signatory
nations that have agreed to allow their citizens to make claims in a supernational judicial
system. As a result, the exhaustion requirement behaves more like a procedural barrier to
suit in a particular court than a substantive basis of a claim, especially in human rights
cases.
¶63
Even if exhaustion is an international law norm, U.S. courts may not apply it if it is
strictly procedural in nature and not a substantive part of a cause of action. Some argue
that the exhaustion of local remedies is either substantive or procedural depending on
what type of offense is committed. Fawcett argued that international law violations fall
into three distinct categories: (1) cases where international law is alleged to be breached,
but not any local law in which case exhaustion is not applicable; (2) cases where the
breach is local but not international in nature, in which case exhaustion is a substantive
bar that prevents international adjudication until a denial of justice is committed by the
state; and (3) cases where the breach is of both local and international law in which case
exhaustion is procedural in nature, except in cases where the state seeks a declaratory
judgment that no violation of international law has taken place. 126
¶64
Since international human rights claims by individual litigants were unknown at the
time Fawcett addressed the issue, his analysis is limited in usefulness by its context;
namely, international commercial disputes and disputes arising under bilateral or
multilateral treaties. Human rights violations are both international and local in nature,
whether or not the laws of the nation in which the violation occurred are enforced. If
124

Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 25 I.L.M.
519, Art. 8 (1986).
125
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 41, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
126
J.E.S. Fawcett, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or Procedure? 31 BRIT . Y.B. INT ’L L.
452, 457-8 (1954).
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exhaustion is procedural, it means that the doctrine merely assigns responsibility between
courts. If it is substantive, it is part of the claim that brings the litigant to the court.
¶65
If the denial of justice on the local level necessitates the international claim, then it
stands to reason that exhaustion of local remedies is indeed substantive in nature. The
Interhandel court also takes the substantive approach: “by its nature it is to be regarded as
a plea which would become devoid of object if the requirement of the prior exhaustion of
local remedies were fulfilled.”127 On the other hand, the TVPA version of exhaustion, in
which the claim is adjudicated if brought up by the defendant as an affirmative defense,
makes the doctrine operate more like a procedural motion such as forum non conveniens.
¶66
Another relevant question about the applicability of exhaustion to ATCA is
whether the international precedent cited to support its adoption applies to the type of
litigants that use it. Under ATCA, aliens can sue other aliens, including corporations,
which are generally considered individuals in the eyes of the law. 128 In Interhandel
(Switz v. U.S.), the International Court of Justice said, “the rule [of exhaustion] has been
generally observed in cases in which a state has adopted the cause of its national whose
rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international
law.”129
B. Conclusion: A Form of Exhaustion is Already Applied to ATCA Plaintiffs in the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens.
¶67

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain can be optimistically
considered a victory for human rights advocates who seek to use U.S. courts to redress
violations that take place outside national boundaries. On one hand, the decision limited
ATCA claims to those “based on the present-day law of nations [that] rest[s] on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with specificity
comparable to the features of 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”130 At first
blush, that requirement reads like a massive restriction of possible torts available under
the statute, but the post-Filartiga ATCA jurisprudence had already restricted the types of
international law violations cognizable in federal courts, excluding, for instance,
environmental claims. 131 However, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the evolutionary
nature of ATCA vindicates two decades’ worth of ATCA jurisprudence and opens the
door to the incorporation of new torts under the statute. When considered in comparison
to the counterva iling (and repeatedly rejected) argument from Tel-Oren that ATCA is
purely jurisdictional and provides no private cause of action, 132 the restrictions in Sosa
can be viewed as merely a codification of existing generally accepted principles.
¶68
In fact, the one element of the Sosa decision that had the capacity to be truly
revolutionary, the engrafting of an exhaustion requirement, was relegated to a footnote
127
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because the instant case did not lend itself to such a discussion. 133 Sarei provided the first
full discussion of the issue following Sosa, with the majority concluding that an
exhaustion requirement should not be read into ATCA based on the lack of original
legislative intent for such a requirement, 134 the inapplicability of TVPA to ATCA
claims, 135 and from the fact that Congress failed to add an exhaustion requirement to
ATCA when it created TVPA -- signaling that judicial discretion in dismissing a case for
non-exhaustion of local remedies is disfavored. 136 Due to the dearth of contemporary
sources explaining ATCA’s goals and the brevity of the statute, divining what the
statute’s authors meant has continually vexed courts. 137 Since TVPA has been held to
cleave off torture and extrajudicial killing from the ATCA, 138 the argument that TVPA
shows that exhaustion belongs in ATCA causes of action is generally unpersuasive. The
treaties and conventions cited in support of the notion that exhaustion is an international
norm are not clearly analogous to ATCA claims and the leading international law cases
on the subject are divided on the issue of whether exhaustion is substantive or procedural.
As a result, the state of international law with regard to exhaustion is not dispositive on
the issue of whether exhaustion belongs in ATCA.
¶69
Where the Sarei majority’s opposition to an exhaustion requirement is weakest is in
the area of judicial discretion. The court’s concern that proponents of an exhaustion
requirement are “lulled into a false sense of familiarity” with the term is overblown.
First, domestic exhaustion and the related domestic common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens (“FNC”) are well- understood, with a large body of precedent from which to
draw. Second, FNC is in many ways parallel to the international law doctrine of
exhaustion in form and effect. The Sarei majority failed to see that the elements of
exhaustion already exist in domestic common law, namely in the requirement that an
adequate alternative forum be available for a suit to be dismissed on FNC grounds. By
dismissing the argument that determining the correct forum for a case is an issue of
judicial discretion, the Sarei decision has ignored the fact that courts have already been
performing all of the elements of exhaustion analysis under the banner of FNC.139 The
“adequate alternative venue” requirement of FNC has been held to exclude foreign
venues where justice would not be available due to corruption or intimidation, just as
exhaustion claims have failed under TVPA’s statutory exhaustion requirement for the
same reasons. 140 The second part of the FNC test includes a list of public and privateinterest factors, many of which read like the list of reasons for an exhaustion requirement
in the TVPA’s Senate report. 141
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¶70

In the past, a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds has been a difficult hurdle for
many ATCA plaintiffs to overcome. 142 However, the fundamental lack of justice
available in many courts that have jurisdiction where human rights violations take place
may negate the benefits of better access to evidence and witnesses. In cases of severe
delay, such as in Xuncax, the most “easy, expeditious and inexpensive” forum is likely in
a U.S. court. 143 As the precedent of TVPA’s exhaustion provision has shown, local
remedies in countries where human rights violations have taken place are rarely
“exhausted” in the manner of domestic administrative remedies; 144 but are instead
rejected outright, similar to venue choice in purely domestic FNC cases. 145 When foreign
courts are involved, the traditional FNC considerations are not limited to purely practical
concerns, such as those listed in Gulf Oil. In Mobil Tankers Co., S. A. v. Mene Grande
Oil Co., a negligence claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepts the Gulf Oil
factors in considering a defense motion to dismiss on FNC grounds, but puts them within
the context that “[t]he ultimate inquiry is whether the retention of jurisdiction by the
district court would best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”146
Clearly, the history of the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement shows that the guiding
principle behind it is essentially that of FNC as interpreted in Mobil Tankers.
¶71
The Senate Report accompanying the TVPA listed effectiveness and speed of the
local remedy and the unfairness (synonymous with lack of justice) of the foreign
jurisdiction as factors to be used when evaluating a defense of non-exhaustion. 147 These
considerations are strikingly similar to the private interest factors of a FNC analysis.
However, courts have not used TVPA exhaustion cases for guidance in evaluating the
quality of a foreign jurisdiction while considering FNC motions under ATCA. By
splitting exhaustion off into a discrete question involving lawmakers’ intent and
international law, the Sarei court has framed the issue in such a way as to discourage the
meaningful ana lysis of whether exhaustion already exists and whether common law
exhaustion (as part of FNC) can be bolstered by lessons learned from statutory
exhaustion under TVPA.
¶72
By considering exhaustion as a wholly discrete doctrine separate from FNC, with
which it shares both goals and means, the Sarei court has increased the risk of a Supreme
Court reversal. In ATCA cases regarding human rights violations, FNC has been one of
the main roadblocks to U.S. courts issuing decisions on the merits. 148 Under TVPA,
exhaustion defenses have been relatively ineffective. 149 Had the Sarei court found it
unnecessary to add an exhaustion requirement to ATCA because it already existed within
FNC, it could have required the lower courts to consider, in their analysis of FNC, the
factors commonly cited by courts evaluating exhaustion defenses in TVPA lawsuits -142
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factors that are largely favorable to plaintiffs. Should a future court decide that
exhaustion is an affirmative defense separate from and in addition to FNC, plaintiffs
would have to clear two hurdles, one relatively difficult (FNC) and one that is likely
easier (exhaustion). Failure to clear either hurdle means the end of the case in U.S.
courts. Should the precedent set by TVPA exhaustion analyses be incorporated into the
FNC common law, the threat of a separate exhaustion requirement would be neutralized
and the FNC requirement itself would be more favorable to plaintiffs.
¶73
At the very least, the Sarei majority missed an opportunity to explain the difference
it saw between FNC as applied to other causes of action and exhaustion as it would
operate under ATCA. At worst, the court may have exempted ATCA claims from FNC
entirely because Congress failed to cover judicial discretion issues when it passed the
statute over 200 years ago. 150 In defending ATCA from the possibility of an exhaustion
requirement as raised in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit split exhaustion from its traditional home
within FNC, and in doing so, overlooked a way to end the exhaustion debate started in
Sosa while creating a fairer standard for plaintiffs.
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